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sampling, mash-ups and other transformative uses) while encouraging activities that are 
problematic (such as hiding sources). This article argues that the trap was laid by the 
German idealist philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte whose influential 1793 article Proof 
of the Unlawfulness of Reprinting for the first time distinguishes Inhalt (i.e. content free 
to all) and Form (i.e. the author’s inalienable expression) as copyright categories. It is 
shown that Fichte’s structure conflates norms of communication and norms of 
transaction. An alternative path for copyright law in an information society is sketched 
from a separation of these norms: copying should be assessed from (i) the attribution of 
sources, and (ii) the degree to which original and derivative materials compete with each 
other. Throughout the article, transformative practices in music set the scene. 
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Introduction  
Modern copyright law assesses infringement predominantly from a proprietary 
perspective. Has anything been taken that is (within the parameters of a protected work) 
of value? An extreme instantiation is an aphorism from a classic British case of 1916 
(University of London Press v University Tutorial Press): There, Peterson J suggested 
that ‘what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting’ – for some even today the 
ultimate test of copyright infringement.1 
 
Aesthetic approaches to copying often ignore what has been taken. Instead, they tend to 
reflect on what has been done with the copied materials. Johann Mattheson’s prescription 
of 1739 is typical for eighteenth century music theory: ‘Taking is a permitted thing; but 
one must refund what has been borrowed with interest, i.e. one must furnish and 
elaborate the imitations so that they gain greater beauty and recognition than the pieces 
from which they had been taken.’2  
 
Today, the practices flourishing in the digital environment appear to side with the latter 
approach, while copyright law has engaged in a rearguard action against sampling, 
parody, mash-ups, and countless other transformative practices. 
 
                                                 
1 The evolution of copyright case law and statutes in the key jurisdictions is much more complex than our 
distinction between ‘what has been taken’, and ‘what has been done to it’ suggests. Yet, current UK law is 
a good illustration of a broad trend. To be sure, the University of London case is not uncontroversial. For 
example, Lord Justice Jacob suggests in Nova v Mazooma (2007) that findings of copying ‘are the starting 
point for a finding of infringement, not the end point’ (at 26). ‘Otherwise it would require the copying of 
insubstantial parts to be an infringement – which is so absurd as to be assuredly wrong’ (at 29). Contrast 
the misappropriation doctrine in the leading infringement decision from the highest UK court (House of 
Lords). According to Designer Guild v Russell Williams (2002), the infringement test for ‘altered copying’ 
assesses whether the defendant is using the claimant’s skill and labour. If there are sufficient similarities 
between original and alleged copy, a ‘substantial part’ question may not even be asked. 
2 The original German wording from Mattheson’s book Der vollkommene Kapellmeister (literally, The 
Complete Chapel-Master) reads (1739, p. 131): ‘Entlehnen ist eine erlaubte Sache; man muss aber das 
Entlehnte mit Zinsen erstatten, d.i. man muss die Nachahmungen so einrichten und ausarbeiten, daß sie ein 
schöneres und besseres Ansehen gewinnen, als die Sätze,  aus welcher sie entlehnet sind.’ All translations 
in this article are the authors’ own. 
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This article will take a closer look at the philosophical and aesthetical developments that 
coincided with copyright law’s emerging concept of an abstract, self-contained, 
permanent work as the locus of protection. In the first section, the pre-copyright practices 
of music during the eighteenth century are sketched, and then contrasted with the 
aesthetic assertions of the musical work as an independent branch of the arts during the 
early years of the nineteenth century. The second section argues that the corresponding 
restrictive approach to copyright infringement (as applied, for example, to performances 
and arrangements) takes its lead from Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s distinction of Inhalt 
(content) and Form in his 1793 article Proof of the Unlawfulness of Reprinting. The third 
and final section proposes an alternative model that, it is argued, resolves the tensions 
between digital information pastiche and copyright law in a coherent way. 
 
 
The aesthetic transformation: constructing abstract works 
Distinctions between original and copy, between work, adaptation and performance, are 
alien to musical practices pre-1800. These categories are the result of an aesthetic and 
legal turn we locate in the dichotomy of Inhalt (content) and Form that underpins, in 
contradictory ways, romantic aesthetic theory and legal philosophy. 
 
Central to the musical practice of the seventeenth and eighteenth century was not the 
work of a particular composer but the event, the unique performance in a specific ritual 
context. This applies to religious functions, to dance music at court, and also to early 
opera. Of lasting artistic standing was not the music, but the play. Opera plays were 
printed as ‘little books’ (libretti), sold and distributed even abroad, while the musical 
scores remained unpublished. On the poster for the first performance of the Magic Flute 
(1791), the name of Emanuel Schikaneder (playwright, actor and entrepreneur) is printed 
much larger than Mozart’s.  
 
Recognised classical sources were regurgitated again and again, in particular in the 
versions of Pietro Metastasio whose libretti were set to music by dozens of composers. 
Each season, a different Kapellmeister may have been responsible for the musical 
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direction. He (it was always a he) would write new music, often integrating the most 
successful arias of the past seasons. For example, a Florentine production of Metastasio’s 
Didone abbandonata of 1725, integrated arias by no less than three composers (Vivaldi, 
Orlandini, and Gasparini). Centre stage was not the composer whose works were to be 
reproduced according to his intentions but a practical musical mind, the Kapellmeister 
who adjusted the available musical material to the abilities of the singers, and to the 
dramaturgic constraints of the occasion. 
 
In churches and monasteries, older music persisted for longer, and was also copied and 
distributed. But here too, the scores were continuously modified and adjusted for 
changing tastes and occasions. The contracts of court and church composers typically 
regulated the provision of music, but did not care where the material came from, or who 
wrote it (Pohlmann 1962).  
 
Opera entrepreneurs, court administrators, church officials, even musicians and their 
audience paid little attention to sources or authenticity of music. J. S. Bach, according to 
an analysis of his manuscripts, never copied a work without making changes (Marshall 
1972). G. F. Händel frequently used melodies of contemporary composers as themes for 
his own works (Buelow 1987). For Mozart’s Magic Flute, 43 borrowed melodies have 
been identified, 33 from his own works, three each from pieces by Haydn and Gluck, and 
one each from Gassmann, Benda, Wranitzky and Philidor (Hyatt King 1950). 
 
During the course of the eighteenth century, these all-pervasive practices of change, 
customisation and appropriation eventually became problematic, as a new conception of 
music took hold. Historically aware copyright scholars (Woodmansee & Jaszi 1994; 
Boyle 1996; Marshall 2005) have recognised a, then new, demand for ‘original 
authorship’ associated with the literary theory of the time. One of the earliest writers to 
plea for originality, rather than conformity to classical rules was Edward Young in his 
Conjectures on Original Composition (1759, §80): ‘As far as a regard to Nature, and 
sound Sense, will permit a Departure from your great Predecessors; so far, ambitiously, 
depart from them; the farther from them in Similitude, the nearer are you to them in 
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Excellence; you rise by it into an Original; become a noble Collateral, not an humble 
Descendant from them.’ And indeed, by the end of the century, this was widely accepted.  
The productions of true artists would need to be characteristic, reflecting a unique 
persona.  
 
However, we contend that a genius aesthetics itself is not sufficient to explain the 
transformation associated with the turn to the nineteenth century. For music, the aesthetic 
propertisation of genius relied on an emerging conception of the abstract work that may 
be boldly summarised in five propositions: 
 
(1) Imitation, emulation and originality are mediated by form 
While according to pre-modern aesthetic standards, artefacts were judged against their 
similarity (resemblance) either to nature or to earlier artefacts, post-Kantian aesthetics 
focusses on the creator’s person and the relation to her predecessors in gauging both – the 
degree of emulation and the distinction as a creative personality.  Form is the flexible 
concept that allows both attributions: emulation and personal marking. The demand for 
genius is mediated by form.  In Immanuel Kant’s words (Kritik der Urteilskraft 1790, 
§49): ‘The product of a genius … is not an example of imitation (since the essence of the 
genius and of the spirit of work would be lost) but rather an example of emulation 
[Nachfolge] of another genius. It is through emulation that the consciousness is woken to 
its own originality.’ [‘Nach diesen Voraussetzungen ist Genie: die musterhafte 
Originalität der Naturgabe eines Subjekts im freien Gebrauche seiner 
Erkenntnisvermögen. Auf solche Weise ist das Produkt eines Genies (nach demjenigen, 
was in demselben dem Genie, nicht der möglichen Erlernung oder der Schule, 
zuzuschreiben ist) ein Beispiel nicht der Nachahmung (denn da würde das, was daran 
Genie ist und den Geist des Werks ausmacht, verlorengehen), sondern der Nachfolge für 
ein anderes Genie, welches dadurch zum Gefühl seiner eigenen Originalität aufgeweckt 
wird.’] A nineteenth-century composer writing a symphony is always both emulating 
Beethoven in his ‘form’ (four movements, sonata form, modulations etc) as well as 
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marking off his personality from Beethoven’s by using other techniques and varying 
formal elements.3 
 
 
(2) Music is an autonomous branch of the arts 
Eighteenth century debates about originality mostly focused on poetry and paintings, 
rarely on music. Music, in the hierarchy of the arts, was considered not as a work (ergon), 
but as an activity (energeia) – to use Humboldt’s later analogy to language (1836). Thus 
Mattheson (1739, 82) talks of music as Ton-Sprache or Klang-Rede, literally ‘a speech in 
sound’. The aesthetics of the nineteenth century almost reversed that hierarchy, coining 
the term ‘absolute’ for music that did not depict or speak (Dahlhaus 1978). Now, the 
abstract harmonic and thematic relations, in particular within non-verbal instrumental 
music, were seen as a superior art, constructing an autonomous text open to formal 
analysis. This avoided the common allegation that music merely played with sentiments, 
thus not addressing the higher human faculties (Kant 1790, §269), and satisfied the 
demand that art be evaluated according to autonomous criteria, not through the similarity 
to natural phenomena (ibid., §49) . 
 
 
(3) Within abstract works of music there can be a distinction between content and form 
The formal relations within a work of music may be decoded to reveal an abstract 
content. As the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer writes (1988 [1819], p. 345): Music 
expresses the inner substance, ‘the will itself’ – not a particular joy or sadness but ‘the 
joy’, or ‘the sadness’ in abstracto. This slightly mysterious thought achieved 
considerable popularity among bourgeois music lovers, culminating in the critic Eduard 
Hanslick’s circular dictum of 1854 that ‘moving forms in sound’ (tönend bewegte 
Formen) constitute the ‘content of music’ (Inhalt der Musik). The central controversy for 
nineteenth century music becomes the choice between the aesthetics of form 
                                                 
3 The tension between originality and imitation became a lasting problem of romantic theory: How could 
one distinguish originality from contrived folly? As Schlegel (1991 [1797], p. 52) puts it: ‘The greater the 
already existing mass of originality, the rarer becomes new true originality.’  
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(Formästhetik, exemplified by Brahms) and the aesthetics of content (Inhaltsästhetik, 
exemplified by Wagner). 
 
 
(4) Performers separate from composers into interpreters of form 
Composing as a profession did not exist prior to the concept of the musical work. Earlier 
musicians were employed as Kapellmeister or instrumentalist. A few became 
entrepreneurs in organising operas or concerts (Händel and Bach/Abel in London). Many 
free-lance composers of the early nineteenth century earned their living as pianists, often 
playing their own works (Beethoven, Liszt, Chopin). During the nineteenth century, a 
new form of concert programming appears, presenting works by past composers. This 
can be traced in the performing life of Clara Schumann (1819-1896). During the 1840s, 
her programmes still include improvisations (Fantasie) and virtuosic arrangements of 
popular melodies; after about 1850, she often performs programmes consisting entirely of 
‘classical’ works, for example by Bach, Beethoven, Chopin and Mendelssohn (all then 
dead). The musical work-concept now guarantees that the composer’s intention (Inhalt) 
can be truly revived and communicated in a performance reproducing the form (Form). 
 
 
(5) Notation is capable of representing an authentic form (Werktreue) 
Franz Liszt’s (1811-1896) aims as a performer still were ‘unmediated relationships’ [die 
unmittelbarsten Beziehungen] between the audience and the artist (Liszt 1838, p. 427). 
Thus, he made liberal use of current operatic hits, and in his early years even improvised 
on melodies given by the public. The intention of the composer was of secondary 
importance. Yet increasingly, performers began to study the scores of past works for 
clues of symbolic structure and the composer’s mind. Simultaneously, contemporary 
notation increased in complexity, prescribing speed, dynamic, rhythm and phrasing that 
previously would not have mattered, as performances took place in a common tradition, 
and music would have been short-lived. In music publishing, the first complete editions 
of the oeuvre of Bach (since 1851) and Händel (since 1858) sought to reconstitute the 
‘authentic shape’ (ächte Gestalt) of the compositions (Jahn 1850). 
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The new aesthetic understanding of music that we have aimed to capture in these five 
propositions is perhaps a little overstated. The change was not universal (it was most 
fully articulated in Germany), and did not cover all forms of music equally. However, we 
claim that the five propositions delineate the aesthetics that is reflected in modern music 
copyright – as for example shown in Bently’s perceptive analysis of the current British 
legal concept of authorship (in this issue). 
 
Musicologists have long identified the fundamental ‘regulative role’ of the ‘musical 
work-concept’ (Dahlhaus 1978; Goehr 1992, p. 113). Yet, the idea to set these aesthetic 
and philosophical developments against the emergence of copyright law is comparatively 
new. Martha Woodmansee in her seminal 1984 article ‘The Genius and the Copyright’ 
recognised that something important was going on in eighteenth century Germany but her 
approach, focussing on literature, perhaps overplays ‘romantic authorship’ as the driver 
of copyright law. As we have argued, an aesthetics of genius is not sufficient to establish 
property rights.  
 
Anne Barron has a subtle and, in our view, fundamentally correct account of the process 
of abstraction that was necessary in law to solve ‘complex questions of attribution and 
identification’ (Barron 2006a, p. 42) in the early British copyright debate. In plain words, 
if buyers and sellers want to transact something ‘beyond the inscribed surface of a book’s 
pages’ (ibid., p. 43) they have to define what that is. Perhaps provocatively, Barron 
claims that aesthetics and law developed on parallel tracks (each according to their own 
logic) – with law preceding Lydia Goehr’s aesthetic ‘watershed year’ of 1800 by several 
decades.4  
                                                 
4 Barron (2006b, p. 114) cites the eminent jurists William Blackstone (argument for the plaintiff in Tonson 
v Collins –1762) and Lord Mansfield (the judge in Millar v Taylor – 1769). Mansfield on the object of 
literary property is quoted with ‘somewhat intellectual, communicated by letters’ ‘detached from the 
manuscript or any other physical existence whatsoever’. Deazley (2008a, commentary on Tonson v Collins) 
even ascribes to Blackstone a ‘tripartite understanding of the work’ – the physical book, the ideas conveyed 
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In an earlier paper of ours (Kawohl & Kretschmer 2003) we see the extension of the 
scope of copyright law to cover performances, transcriptions and arrangements during the 
early 1800s as an important indicator of this legal abstraction – as one needs to ask: 
performances, transcriptions and arrangement of what? – thus implying the definition of 
an abstract entity: the protected work.  
 
While the legal protection of performative, derivative and transformative acts presumes 
the identity of the object of protection, and the aesthetic distinction of abstract, authored 
works presumes the identity of the authentic work; it is not clear at all how these 
identifications could be achieved with the conceptual apparatus assembled before 1800. 
Enter Johann Gottlieb Fichte. 
 
 
 
The legal transformation: constructing inalienable expression 
It is an interesting question in itself why key concepts of modern copyright law came to 
be developed in Germany. During the eighteenth century, Britain had the most dynamic 
market for the arts (books, visual arts and music), was home to a very lively aesthetic and 
jurisprudential debate, and already had experienced many court cases (following the 
passing of the first statutory copyright law for ‘books and other writings’ (Statute of 
Anne, 1710) and the engravers’ copyright act (so-called Hogarth’s Act, 1735). In 
contrast, the German speaking world was a feudal patchwork of some 300 jurisdictions 
that relied on a complex privilege system to regulate publishing. Reprinting of successful 
books was extremely common, and often encouraged by competing rulers (Kawohl 2002; 
Kawohl & Kretschmer 2003). 
 
The German discussion initially took its lead from the British ‘literary property’ debate, 
reflecting the London booksellers’ sustained attempt to establish a common law property 
                                                                                                                                                 
in that book, and the composition (according to Blackstone: ‘those words in which an author has clothed 
his ideas’). 
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right beyond the limited statutory term of 14 years (renewable once) provided by the 
Statute of Anne (Deazley 2004). However, in Donaldson v Becket (1774) the House of 
Lords (the highest English court) reversed earlier court decisions – and the jurisprudential 
reasoning by William Blackstone in Tonson v Collins (1762) and Lord Mansfield in 
Millar v Taylor (1769) that had moved towards an abstract work identity.5  
 
The German proponents of unregulated reprinting initially picked up the British anti-
abstraction arguments. For example, Joseph Yates (later the dissenting judge in Millar) 
said as counsel for the defendant in Tonson (1762, p. 333): ‘I allow, that the Author has a 
Property in his Sentiments, till he publishes them. […] But from the Moment of 
Publication, they are thrown into a State of Universal Communion. […] It is no species of 
Property upon general Principles; because it is incapable of separate and exclusive 
Enjoyment.’ Similarly, Christian Sigmund Krause writes in a short treatise About 
Reprinting (Ueber den Büchernachdruck – 1783, p. 416): a book is a ‘secret divulged’ 
[ausgeplaudertes Geheimnis]. It is evident that ‘the concept of intellectual property is 
useless; my property must be exclusively mine; I must be able to give it away completely 
and retrieve it completely’ [dass der Begriff des geistiges Eigenthum unbrauchbar ist; 
Mein Eigenthum muss ausschliessend mein sein; ich muss es ganz weggeben, ganz 
zurücknehmen können].6  
 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, an idealist philosopher influenced by Kant, responds to a version 
of this argument by the Hamburg publisher Reimarus (1791, p. 385) who explicitly 
referred to the repudiation of ‘literary property’ in the British discussions. In the article 
Proof of the Unlawfulness of Reprinting (Beweis von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des 
Büchernachdrucks, 1793), Fichte intends to solve the difficulty on which basis ideas, 
                                                 
5 For the next 100 years, Britain’s copyright laws remained ambivalent, preserving a series of specific laws 
regulating specific subject matter, such as engravings, sculptures, designs, paintings, drawings and 
photographs (Sherman &  Bently 1999) –  although the 1842 Copyright Act and the Fine Art Copyright Act 
(1862) moved towards an abstract work identity for literary, dramatic, musical works and artistic works 
(Seville 1999; Kawohl & Kretschmer 2003; Deazley 2008b). The United States followed the narrow 
incentive approach of the Statute of Anne well into the twentieth century, but here too the concept of an 
abstract work found its way into court decision on derivative works (Folsom v Marsh 1841; cf. Bracha 
2008). 
6 A related passage of Krause’s treatise is cited in Woodmansee (1984, 443). 
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once communicated, may remain ‘the continuous property of the originator’ [ein 
fortdaurendes Eigenthum des Verfassers – Fichte 1793, p. 445].  
 
From the premise that ‘we necessarily own as property anything that cannot be physically 
transferred to someone else’ [Wir behalten nothwendig das Eigenthum eines Dinges, 
dessen Zueignung durch einen Andern physisch unmöglich ist – Fichte 1793, p. 446], 
Fichte’s argument follows two threads: One is object-oriented and leads to the modern 
concept of a ‘work’, the other one is subject-orientated and provides a justification for 
intellectual property to be vested in the author. On the object side, the work concept is 
gained as a result of a two-fold abstraction from the book as commodity. On the subject 
side, there are different forms of property allocated to the respective results of the 
abstraction. 
 
The two threads arise from quite different discourses. The latter argument, about 
differentiation and abstraction, is based on eighteenth century discussions about 
reprinting, which were led by publishers rather than authors and thus focused on physical 
entities rather than authors’ personalities: on original prints and on reprints, both 
competing commodities within the market for books. By contrast, the justification of 
intellectual property was rooted in concepts of personality and in a fundamental right to 
self-expression.7 
 
Fichte first identifies two aspects of the book: he differentiates between a ‘physical 
aspect’ of the book, i.e. ‘the printed paper, and its intellectual aspect’ [das ‘körperliche 
desselben, das bedruckte Papier; und sein geistiges’] (Fichte 1793: p. 447). Within the 
intellectual aspect another distinction is made between the ‘material’ aspect of the 
intellectual, further specified as ‘the content of the book, the thoughts it presents; and the 
form of these thoughts, the way in which, the combination in which, the phrasing and 
wording in which they are presented’ [das Materielle, den Inhalt des Buchs, die 
                                                 
7 This echoes Immanuel Kant’s 1781 essay Of the Illegality of Reprinting (Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des 
Büchernachdrucks) which Fichte claims not to have known when he first devised his ‘form’ argument 
(1793, p. 472). 
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Gedanken, die es vorträgt; und in die Form dieser Gedanken, die Art wie, die Verbindung 
in welcher, die Wendungen und die Worte, mit denen es sie vorträgt] (Fichte 1793: p. 
446). 
 
Then there are three types of property assigned:  
 
- ‘The [printed paper] ceases to be the author’s property when it is sold…, and 
becomes an exclusive property of the buyer, because it cannot have different 
masters’ [‘Das (bedruckte Papier) … hört durch den Verkauf unmittelbar auf, ein 
Eigenthum des Verfassers … zu sein, und wird ausschließendes des Käufers, weil 
es nicht mehrere Herren haben kann’] (Fichte 1793: pp. 449-50).  
 
- At the moment of publication, the ideas or content of the book ceases to be 
‘exclusive property of its first master’, turning into a ‘common property of many”, 
i.e. of all the readers [Es hört auf ‘ausschliessendes Eigenthum des ersten Herrn 
zu sein … bleibt aber sein mit Vielen gemeinschaftliches Eigenthum’] (Fichte 
1793: p. 450). 
  
- The third aspect is inalienable, as Fichte puts it: ‘However, what never anybody can 
take possession of, since it is physically impossible, is the form of these thoughts, 
the combinations of ideas in which, and the signs, by which they are presented’ 
[‘Was aber schlechterdings nie jemand sich zueignen kann, weil dies physisch 
unmöglich bleibt, ist die Form dieser Gedanken, die Ideenverbindungen, in der, 
und die Zeichen, mit denen sie vorgetragen werden.’] (Fichte 1793: p. 450). 
 
This concept of ‘form’ is crucial to Fichte’s ‘proof’ since the form provides the link 
between the discourses. Within the two-tiered abstraction of the work, ‘form’ plays the 
decisive role in the second step – form and content abstracted from the intellectual aspect 
of the work –, whereas the first step – abstraction of the physical book and its content – 
was trivial and well known. ‘Form’ is likewise the justificatory basis for the claim to 
intellectual property.  
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In Fichte’s words: ‘Because pure ideas without sensualised images are unthinkable, and 
even less can be presented to others, each writer must give his own thoughts a certain 
form, and he can give them no other form than his own because he has no other. But 
neither can he be willing to hand over this form in making his thoughts public, for no one 
can appropriate his thoughts without thereby altering their form. The latter thus remains 
forever his exclusive property.’ [Da nun reine Ideen ohne sinnliche Bilder sich nicht 
einmal denken, vielweniger Andern darstellen lassen, so muß freilich jeder Schriftsteller 
seinen Gedanken eine gewisse Form geben, und kann ihnen keine andere geben als die 
seinige, weil er keine andere hat; aber er kann durch die Bekanntmachung seiner 
Gedanken gar nicht Willens sein, auch diese Form gemein zu machen: denn Niemand 
kann seine Gedanken sich zueignen, ohne dadurch daß er ihre Form verändere. Die 
letztere also bleibt auf immer sein ausschliessendes Eigenthum.] (Fichte 1793: p. 451). 
 
Fichte’s form-concept is contradictory. On the one hand, it is the result of the abstraction 
of a physical entity: of the book as commodity. That is to say, from this angle, ‘form’ is 
an intrinsic quality of the physical book. On the other hand, it is a concept of perception 
and communication. From this angle, then, it is dependent on the respective person, who 
either – as an author – necessarily uses his own form as a means to communicate his 
thoughts, or – as a reader – necessarily changes the author’s form in appropriating the 
enclosed thoughts. Thus, ‘form’ as a result of abstraction from the book had to be 
identical in the view of whoever read or reprinted the book. Yet ‘form’ as a means of 
communication was a fluid side-effect, flexibly changing its shape every time the book 
was used. 
 
This ambiguous form-concept aims to fit with Fichte’s philosophy of property and with 
the Romantics’ ideal of free and original expression. Fichte employed a quite similar 
conceptual approach shortly after the Proof article in an essay on the legal grounds of 
property. It reads: ‘After we have given the things a form of a mean for our ends, no other 
being can use them but either using the effect of our vigour, i.e. our vigour itself, which is 
originally our own property; or destroying this form, which means restraining our vigour 
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in their free effects … and that no rational being ought to.’ [‘Haben wir Dingen diese 
Form eines Mittels für unsere Zwecke gegeben, so kann kein anderes Wesen sie 
gebrauchen, ohne entweder die Wirkung unserer Kräfte, mithin unsere Kräfte selbst, die 
doch ursprünglich unser Eigentum sind, für sich zu verwenden; oder ohne diese Form zu 
zerstören, d.i. unsere Kräfte in ihrer freien Wirkung aufzuhalten … das aber darf kein 
vernünftiges Wesen.] (Fichte 1793: p. 81, quoted in Brocker 1992: p. 311). Here too 
‘form’ begins as a dynamic concept of expressing and extending our vigour onto things 
before turning into a justification of durable property. 
 
However, under our interpretation the emerging concept of the durable form is 
inconsistent with the prevailing Romantic aesthetics of the time. Walter Benjamin 
captures it well: ‘Unlike the enlightenment, the romantics did not conceive form as a rule 
of beauty, as a necessary condition for an enjoyable or sublime effect of their work. Their 
form was neither conceived as a rule of its own nor dependent on rules… Every form was 
conceived as a peculiar modification of the self-limitation of reflection, it did not require 
an other reflection, because it was not a medium of representation of content.’ [‘Die 
Romantiker faßten nicht, wie die Aufklärer, die Form als eine Schönheitsregel der Kunst, 
ihre Befolgung als eine notwendige Vorbedingung für die erfreuliche oder erhebende 
Wirkung des Werkes auf. Ihre Form galt ihnen weder selbst als Regel noch auch als 
abhängig von Regeln… Jede Form als solche galt als eine eigentümliche Modifikation 
der Selbstbegrenzung der Reflexion, einer anderen Reflexion bedarf sie nicht, weil sie 
nicht Mittel zur Darstellung eines Inhalts ist.’] (Benjamin 1973: p. 71). 
 
Fichte’s slight of hand turns the subject centred reflection of Romantic aesthetics – which 
plausibly theorises the author’s expressions as inalienable – into something durable and 
unchangeable that can function as an object: property. As Fichte puts it (1793: p. 452): 
the property in the form gives the author the right to prevent ‘that no-one interfere with 
the exclusive property of that form, and appropriate that form’ [‘das Recht, zu 
verhindern, daß Niemand in sein ausschließendes Eigenthum dieser Form Eingriffe thue, 
und sich des Besitzes derselben bemächtige]. One might say, pace Woodmansee (1984), 
that modern copyright was born not out of the romantic notion of genius, but despite it.  
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Fichte’s essay proved hugely influential. His distinctions surface in preliminary papers to 
the Prussian Act (1837) ‘for the protection of property in works of scholarship and the 
arts from reprint and reproduction’, the seminal German copyright legislation of the 
nineteenth century (Wadle 1988; Kretschmer & Kawohl 2004). Over the next 200 years, 
the so-called idea/expression dichotomy became an integral part of US jurisprudence8 
and found its way into the 1991 European software directive (91/250/EEC; Art. 1(2)), the 
1994 WTO TRIPS Agreement and the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty. The wording of 
TRIPS (Art. 9(2)) and WIPO Copyright Treaty (Art. 2) is identical: Copyright protection 
shall extend ‘to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or 
mathematical concepts as such.’ 
 
Before we trace the effects of Fichte’s concepts on music copyright, and in particular its 
application to activities of a performative, derivative or transformative kind, we conclude 
this section with a brief review of Fichte’s analysis of what we now call infringement:  
 
(1) Forwarding books to others, incorporating books into lending libraries, even 
destroying books is permitted. This only affects the ‘material’ aspect of the book 
that, as all writers concede, becomes the ‘complete property’ of the buyer. 
[Schriftsteller haben uns ‘bis itzt durchgängig das völlige Eigenthum des 
körperlichen ihrer Schriften zugestanden’.] (Fichte 1793, p. 452) 
 
(2) Plagiarism (i.e. passing on copied words as the copier’s own) is wrong not 
because it denies the authorship of the original writer [dem Verfasser seine 
Autorschaft abspreche], or violates the author’s honour [dem Verfasser die 
rechtmäßige Ehre nicht erzeige]; the wrong of plagiarism lies in the attempt to 
seize something (the ‘form’) that cannot be appropriated [dass der Plagiar sich 
                                                 
8 Oren Bracha (2008, commentary on Folsom v Marsh (1841)) argues that although the dichotomy in 
twentieth century American copyright law was often used to construct the ‘fair use’ doctrine, nineteenth 
century readings supported the expansion of the scope of copyright law. 
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eines Dinges bemächtiget, welches nicht sein ist]. (Fichte 1793, pp. 453-4)9 
 
(3) Changing the method of copying does not affect the wrong of copying. Copying 
by rewriting a book by hand is as wrong as reprinting, as it necessarily takes the 
‘form’ of the work. ‘Those who wish to possess a copy of the book, or the copyist 
must negotiate with the author.’  [(D)iejenigen, welche das Buch in Abschrift zu 
besitzen wünschten, oder der Abschreiber, müßte darüber in Unterhandlung mit 
dem Verfasser treten]. (Fichte 1793, p. 463) 
 
(4) The printing of transcriptions of lectures is equally wrong. No lecturer would 
suffer that the ‘form’ of his lecture be seized by a transcriber. However, students 
which have made the lecturer’s thoughts their own ‘through their own reflection, 
and the integration of those thoughts into their own line of ideas’ [durch ihr 
eignes Nachdenken, und die Aufnahme derselben in ihre Ideenreihe’ –  Fichte 
1793, p. 456] may distribute their notes orally and in writing. 
 
(5) Quotations literally seize the ‘form’ of the original, but are permissible as being 
based on a ‘tacit mutual contract between all authors’ [scheint sich auf einen 
stillschweigenden Vertrag der Schriftsteller unter einander zu gründen – Fichte 
1793, p. 455]. However, quoting large passages ‘without visible need’ [ohne 
sichtbares Bedürfniss] is wrong. 
 
(6) Engravings of paintings change the ‘form’, and are permitted. [Kupferstiche von 
Gemälden sind keine Nachdrücke: sie verändern die Form – Fichte 1793, p. 
468)]. Equally re-engravings of engravings, since every engraver gives his print 
his own form. Only reprinting from already engraved plates is a wrong. 
 
(7) The publisher does not acquire property through his contract with the author, only 
a certain usufruct [Niessbrauch]. He only can sell on the possibility to acquire the 
                                                 
9 The term ‘bemächtigen’ most naturally would translate as ‘appropriate’, but ‘taking as property’ is 
precisely what Fichte claims cannot be done to an author’s form. 
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author’s thoughts through the means of print, never the thoughts of the author 
itself, and their form. [Er darf an wen er will und kann, verkaufen – nicht die 
Gedanken des Verfassers, und ihre Form, sondern nur die durch den Druck 
derselben hervorgebrachte Möglichkeit sich die erstern zuzueignen (Fichte 1793: 
p. 457)]. At all times, the publisher acts not in his own name [nicht in seinem 
Namen], but on behalf of the author [sondern im Namen und auf Auftrag des 
Verfassers]. 
 
(8) The potential benefits or harm of the act of copying do not matter. Eighteenth 
century reprinters often argued that reprinting did not cause any harm either to 
the author or the original publisher. Fichte cites Reimarus’ claim (1791) that the 
more an author was being reprinted, the more his fame would spread to his 
advantage across all German states [dass es sogar der Vortheil des Schriftstellers 
sei, recht viel nachgedruckt zu werden, daß dadurch sein Ruhm über alle Staaten 
Deutschlands (…) verbreitet werde (Fichte 1793, p. 460)]. In contrast, Fichte 
insists on the ‘sublime idea of right, regardless of utility’ [die erhabene Idee des 
Rechts, ohne alle Rücksicht auf Nutzen]. 
 
At the heart of Fichte’s approach to copyright infringement is a paradox. The illegitimate 
copyist takes something that, according to Fichte’s theory, cannot be taken. On the one 
hand, ‘form’ is a fluid concept of communication and perception; on the other hand, 
‘form’ is an intrinsic quality of the book as a commodity: the former is inalienable 
expression; the latter is property. 
 
This leaves the concrete application of the content/form or, in later parlance, 
idea/expression dichotomy in disarray. You call it content (idea), if the taking is 
permitted; you call it form (expression), if it is not. In each case, an abstract entity is 
implied – the work – through which everything that is done by a secondary or derivative 
user is related to the author’s personality. 
 
The next section considers the implications of this approach for music. 
 18 
 
 
An information perspective on copyright infringement 
Fichte did not reflect on the musical practices of customisation, arrangement, 
performance and interpretation that so evidently draw on earlier materials. Yet, the 
aesthetic and legal turn associated with the period around 1800 shifted the concepts of 
music copyright irrevocably. In any assessment of infringement, the ‘object’ concept of 
the abstract work now would have to be mapped onto the ‘subject’ concept of inalienable 
expression. If our analysis is correct, this cannot be done coherently. For example, while 
Fichte thought that engraving a painting changed the ‘form’ (and thus was permissible), 
current copyright laws almost universally treat it as impermissible copying in as far as it 
involves the taking of a substantial part of the original expression. However, there is 
nothing in the conceptual apparatus that would explain this change. Thus the assessment 
of infringement can shift within the conceptual space constructed by Fichte almost 
randomly. A particular danger is that there is no clear barrier legitimising permissible act: 
all secondary or derivative uses of all artistic materials are potentially infringing, 
depending on how the abstraction of ‘form’ is represented on its ‘object’ and ‘subject’ 
dimensions. 
 
Fichte’s copyright space can be visualised by a diagram. The vertical y-axis may be 
thought of as the ‘subject’ dimension, while the horizontal x-axis scales the ‘object’ 
dimension. The further an act of copying moves upwards (y-axis) and rightwards (x-
axis), the more likely will it be found to have infringed the original work. Thus, under a 
Fichtean analysis, the act of plagiarism will be the clearest case of infringement 
(maximum harm on both subject and object dimensions) while an accurate transcription 
will appropriate a work (object infringement) but not harm the personality of its author 
(no subject infringement). A parody, vice versa, will seek to generate amusement or 
criticism from personality elements (subject infringement) although the work is 
significantly changed (no object infringement). Quotations, in the bottom left corner, will 
cause little harm on either dimension.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Activities towards the middle of the diagram are the most problematic for the theory. 
Does an imitation, a reworking or an arrangement appropriate subjective and objective 
form in Fichte’s sense? Much of the thrust of copyright developments during the 
nineteenth century pushed derivative uses further out into the infringing space. For 
example, piano transcriptions or instrumental arrangements of popular operas were 
initially treated as ‘translations’ that required no permission. In an 1822 expertise for a 
Berlin court, the romantic poet and lawyer ETA Hoffmann still compares an unauthorised 
piano score of Carl Maria von Weber’s Freischütz to the (permitted) engraving of a 
painting (Kawohl 2002; Kawohl & Kretschmer 2003, p. 215).  
 
However an agreement between music publishers (Erweiterungsakte, Leipzig 1831; 
Kawohl 2008) declared the melody as the property element in a composition: ‘The 
melody is recognised as exclusive property of the publisher and every arrangement is 
regarded as a reprint that shows the tones of the composer and only is based on 
mechanical processing’ [Die Melodie wird als ausschließliches Eigentum des Verlegers 
anerkannt und jedes Arrangement, das die Töne des Componisten wiedergibt und nur auf 
mechanischer Verarbeitung beruht, soll als Nachdruck angesehen werden]. The Prussian 
Act of 1837 followed with a protection against musical arrangements that could not be 
considered ‘an original composition’ [eine eigenthümliche Composition]. The German 
imperial Urheberrecht of 1901 codifies property in melodies as starrer Melodienschutz in 
§13 II LUG (as §24 II UrhG this provision is still part of current German copyright law).  
 
Similarly, in the British case of D’Almaine v Boosey (1835), copyright in the score of the 
opera Lestoq by Daniel Auber was held to be infringed by the publication of 
arrangements of excerpts as quadrilles and waltzes. Lord Chief Baron said (1835, p. 121): 
“Substantially the piracy is where the appropriated music, though adapted to a different 
purpose from that of the original, may still be recognised by ear.” 
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Almost imperceptibly Fichte’s approach to copyright infringement focusing on what had 
been taken from the subject and object aspects of a work’s abstract form, spread from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. At the international level, the Berne Convention of 1886 
(integrated into the global trade system with the WTO TRIPS Agreement of 1994) fused 
the subject interests of the author with abstract literary and artistic works protected for a 
minimum term of life of author plus fifty years, with only very narrowly conceived 
exceptions.  The infringement language may differ in each country, emphasising for 
example the taking of a ‘substantial part’ (UK CDPA 1988 s. 16) or in American 
parlance, applying the test of ‘substantial similarily’ (often reformulated in terms of the 
idea/expression dichotomy – Nimmer & Nimmer 2003, §13.03[A][1]). Whether they 
know it or not, all members of the World Trade Organization are now disciples of Fichte. 
 
The Fichtean perspective (potentially relating all secondary uses to the author through the 
work’s abstract form) was able to negotiate a musical aesthetics that distinguished 
original and copy, adaptation and performance, authentic interpretation and improvisation 
– the period of notated ‘classical’ music between (roughly) 1800 and 1950.  
 
During the course of the twentieth century, the notion of an abstract, self-contained, 
permanent work lost its persuasion. Within the constraints of this article, we cannot trace 
in detail the advent of jazz and blues, the commercialisation of popular music, the 
experimental turn in avantgard composition, the interweaving of graphics, movement, 
visuals and sound.  To music scholars, it is now almost self-evident that the aesthetics of 
the abstract work has been swept away (Toynbee 2004), most notably by the wave of 
digital innovation since the 1980s. Yet, copyright law has persisted with an approach 
under which derivative uses, that leave the original recognisable, are found to be 
infringing almost as a rule.  The aesthetic and legal tensions this generates are reflected in 
the treatment transformative musical uses receive under modern copyright law. For 
illustrative purposes, we offer a brief sketch of seven contemporary musical practices in 
the eyes of the law. The exposition attempts to uncover a broad trend, using non-technical 
language. Naturally, details will vary between jurisdictions. 
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Improvisation 
Improvisations have no independent copyright status. If an improvisation is based on 
a prior copyright work, it is considered to be either a performance or an adaptation. If 
recorded, an improvisation can turn into an authored work itself, i.e. the equivalent of 
a written score (‘publishing right’). However, release of the recording then needs the 
permission of the right holders of the prior work (which may only be achieved by 
assigning the publishing rights of the improvisation to the earlier right holders). 
 
Cover version 
Since the 1950s, the cover version is a staple of the popular music market. Literally, it 
is understood as a re-recording of a song by a different artist. Cover versions can 
depart quite widely from the original: in feel, in instrumentation, even in 
harmonisation and melody. The law may therefore treat it as an adaptation, 
permissible only with permission of the original right owner, and generating a new 
separate copyright in the adaptation as an original work. However, prior right holders 
have found it more advantageous to treat cover versions not as adaptations, but as 
recorded performances of the same song. This leaves the copyright in the cover 
version with the owner of the covered song. 
  
Re-mix 
The re-mix is not a re-recording of the same score but a reassembly of already 
recorded sounds (often with new additions). It came to prominence with the club 
culture of the 1980s.  If not treated as a non-adapted cover version, a re-mix needs the 
permission of both, the right holders in the score and in the sound recording. 
Typically, the publishing rights in the new track (as a new work) will have to be 
assigned to the owners of the earlier score. Often, even a percentage of the rights in 
the new sound recording will have to be contractually transferred as part of the deal 
(so-called ‘override’). 
  
DJ-ing 
Under copyright categories, a DJ is neither a composer nor performer. He or she 
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simply effects the public performance of tracks (incorporating both a copyright work 
and a sound recording). In the eyes of the law, DJ-ing is an unproductive, non-
transformative use of music. However, in contemporary aesthetics, the DJ may be 
perceived as an artist who composes pre-produced tracks into a new form (Wicke 
1997). This is reflected in DJ branded releases of albums and tracks. Copyright 
remuneration will only reach the DJ if his/her contributions are re-categorised as 
interests in a copyright work or sound recording. 
 
Sample 
Sampling is perhaps the defining feature of digitally produced music. Hip Hop may 
have been the first genre that used samples as equivalent to musical instruments. As 
samples, sounds become objects. Hank Shoklee, producer of Public Enemy/Chuck 
D’s seminal album  It Takes a Nation of Millions (1988) described the compositional 
process thus (McLeod 2002): ‘The first thing we would do is the beat, the skeleton of 
the track. The beat would actually have bits and pieces of samples already in it, but it 
would be only rhythm sections. Chuck would start writing and trying different ideas 
to see what worked. Once he got an idea, we would look at it and see where the track 
was going. Then we would just start adding on whatever it needed, depending on the 
lyrics. It kind of architected the whole idea. The sound has a look to me, and Public 
Enemy was all about having a sound that had its own distinct vision. We didn’t want 
to use anything we considered traditional R&B stuff – bass lines and melodies and 
chord structures and things of that nature.’ 
 
Following numerous restrictive court decisions (culminating in the US case 
Bridgeport v Dimension 2005), the aesthetics of sampling changed quite dramatically. 
It became common industry practice to require the clearance of all samples of sound 
recordings. In consequence, electronic artists now only use samples paid for by their 
label (with publishing rights, and often also interests in the sound recordings assigned 
to the owners of the samples used). Alternatively, they hide the source of their 
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samples, undermining the reference character of this compositional technique.10    
 
Mash-up 
Very topical is the layering of two or more existing tracks to create a new experience, 
sometimes with artistic intent, often for amusement. Networking sites that rely on 
user-generated content are littered with this kind of material which is almost always 
infringing copyrights in works and sound recordings. More ambitious techniques 
derive from the1960s tradition of appropriation art and collage. Examples include the 
‘plunderphonic’ aesthetics of Jon Oswald (1985), and bands such as Negativland, 
producing a critical commentary on copyright law itself (Arns 2008). 
 
Sound-alike 
The advertising industry and producers of video games have developed a marketing 
strategy of so-called ‘sound-alikes’ in order to avoid the clearing of rights. Music is 
specifically commissioned to sound like, for example, the voice of Louis Armstrong 
or Frank Sinatra, or the original sound track to Harry Potter (composed by John 
Williams), without taking elements which copyright law would deem substantial, and 
thus infringing. Melody fragments are avoided; instead timbre and harmonic 
progressions skilfully create an allusion of origin.  
 
These seven examples illustrate how ‘borrowing repaid with interest’ (in Mattheson’s 
words, quoted at the outset of this article) has become problematic in a Fichtean 
copyright space. We argue that as musical practices during the twentieth and early 
twenty-first century are departing from the abstract ‘work-concept’, copyright norms 
have to be re-thought. In a digital environment, the framework derived from Fichte’s 
contradictory structure of subject and object ‘form’ should be abandoned. In its place we 
suggest two dimensions that take us back to pre-1800 norms. The object dimension 
becomes a utilitarian economic assessment: Do primary and secondary products compete 
                                                 
10  There is now a large literature in law, ethnomusicology and cultural studies on the phenomenon (Bently 
1989; Seeger 1992; McLeod 2001; Théberge 2004; Hesmondhalgh 2006). More recent court decisions, 
notably the German federal court’s decision on the sampling of Kraftwerk’s Metall auf Metall (2008) have 
become more permissive, moving towards the analysis we advocate in Figure 2. 
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in the same market? Does derivative use affect the incentives of first production? Is the 
primary product no longer viable? Are the costs of derivative production significantly 
lower than the cost of first production?11 In this diagram, the x-axis now represents the 
degree of competition between earlier and derivative materials. Plagiarised and 
transcribed materials are most likely to be found infringing on this dimension. 
 
Our second suggestion replaces Fichte’s subject evaluation with an information 
dimension.12 It is a fundamental principle of an information society that the sources of 
derivative materials should be revealed. In a parody, this may happen by definition (as 
the parody will only work if the audience understands the target). Similarly, a 
requirement to cite with full source references will turn even extended quotations entirely 
innocuous (i.e. low on the y-axis). The most significant differences between the Fichtean 
and our proposed information framework can be seen for derivative uses that were 
previously hovering uncertainly in the middle of the ‘abstract form’ diagram: pastiche 
and imitation uses are no longer assessed by what has been taken, but by the kind of use 
made of it. For example, sampling, typically no longer competes with the original. Thus it 
moves as pastiche to the left. Together with an added requirement to cite the source 
(which currently is often hidden to avoid the clearing of rights), it is now permissible. In 
contrast, sound-alikes, i.e. music that seeks to generate a misleading source connection in 
the audience’s mind, becomes more problematic. It moves up on the y-axis, and to the 
right on the x-axis to the extent that the secondary use competes with the primary 
material.   
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
11 Traces of such economically minded thinking can be found in some pre-1800 jurisprudence (e.g. Gyles v 
Wilcox (1741) – tolerating abridgements), and in the development of ‘fair use’ defences to copyright 
infringement in many jurisdictions during the nineteenth century. For an economic analysis of modern ‘fair 
use’ in the US, see Gordon (1982) and Landes & Posner (1989).  
12 Reimarus, the addressee of Fichte’s paper, had argued for a right to be recognised as the author that 
would not implicate an exclusive right. Fichte dismissed this approach (1793, pp. 451-2): [‘Hieraus fließen 
zwei Rechte der Schriftsteller: nehmlich nicht bloß, wie Herr R. will, das Recht zu verhindern, daß 
Niemand ihm überhaupt das Eigenthum dieser Form abspreche (zu fordern, daß jeder ihn für den Verf. des 
Buchs anerkenne); sondern auch das Recht, zu verhindern, daß Niemand in sein ausschließendes 
Eigenthum dieser Form Eingriffe thue, und sich des Besitzes derselben bemächtige.’] 
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It is the central argument of this article that the concepts of modern copyright law derive 
from a peculiar abstraction that can only be understood in the philosophical and aesthetic 
context of the period around 1800. The legal structure, inspired by Fichte’s thoughts on 
personal inalienable forms of expression, began to fuse norms of communication with 
norms of transaction. Since the object of protection – the abstract work – was being 
conceived as durable and permanent it became plausible to relate all performative, 
derivative and transformative uses back to the author. 
 
The aesthetics of the digital age will require nothing less than a re-invention of 
copyright’s normative space.  
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